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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, Utah R. App. Pro. , and Section 78-2-
2(3) (j), Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended. It arises out of a 
final judgment entered by the trial court dated November 10, 
2004. Notice of Appeal was filed on December 9, 2004. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR, AND STANDARD OF, REVIEW 
Appellant Aurora believes this case presents the 
following issues for review to be determined under the 
accompanying standards of review: 
1. Whether the trial court had the authority, under the 
undisputed facts of defendants' attempted service of its second 
set of discovery, to grant defendants' motion to compel. 
STANDARD: Correction of error, no deference. Morton v. 
Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997) ( basing a 
sanction on an order which is legally erroneous constitutes an 
abuse of discretion). 
RECORD CITATION: R. 1568-84. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in its legal conclusion 
that Aurora violated the court's April 8, 2 003 Order. 
STANDARD: Correction of error, no deference. Morton v. 
Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997) 
RECORD CITATION: R. 2004-23; 3280-97. 
3. Assuming, arguendo, Aurora fails under issues 1 & 2, 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing 
Aurora's claims under the circumstances present in this case. 
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STANDARD: Abuse of discretion. G.M. Leasing Co. v. Murray First 
Thrift & Loan Co.
 f 534 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1975). 
RECORD CITATION: R. 3280-97. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Aurora believes this appeal will be decided by Rules 
5(b) and 37, Utah R. Civ. Pro. and the cases interpreting them, 
as argued herein. See Appendix for text of the pertinent portions 
of these rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves claims by Aurora, both direct and 
derivative, against defendants Gay and XM International 
(hereinafter "XM"), as well as the nominal defendant Liberty West 
Development, Inc. (hereinafter "Liberty West" or "LWD") for 
actions taken which resulted in the "loss" of the only 
significant asset of Liberty West to a separate company of 
defendant Gay's. The defendants' actions which underlie Aurora's 
claims began when the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
("FDIC"), Aurora's assignor, was a pledgee of stock of Liberty 
West (a closely held corporation), and, depending on the court's 
interpretation of Aurora's contract to purchase the Hogle asset 
from the FDIC, ended either just before or just after Aurora 
purchased the Hogle asset from the FDIC. Aurora filed suit on 
August 5, 1994. R. 1. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The 
trial court granted the motion as to Aurora's direct claims only 
on March 20, 1995, R.139-40, and defendants filed an answer. 
After Aurora moved to compel answers to discovery, R. 179-218, 
defendants moved for partial summary judgment on the derivative 
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claims, R. 219-55, which the trial court granted on December 22, 
1995. R. 312-15. These decisions were ultimately consolidated in 
an Order pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah R. Civ. Pro., entered on 
February 13, 1997. R. 462-65. 
Aurora appealled on March 14, 1997. R. 466-67, and the 
decisions to (1) dismiss Aurora's asserted direct claims, and (2) 
grant summary judgment against Aurora's derivative claims under 
the contemporaneous ownership rule were reversed by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West 
Development, Inc., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998) (hereinafter "Aurora 
I"). 
On remand, Aurora renewed its discovery attempts, first 
as to the initial set of discovery served on defendants prior to 
the first appeal, then as to its second set of discovery served 
on defendants on April 6, 2 001. Because of its importance in the 
appellate court's review of this appeal, Aurora will set forth in 
detail the discovery efforts of the parties in the STATEMENT OF 
FACTS immediately following this STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
Ultimately, after a hearing to address Aurora's objections 
to defendants' responses to Aurora's second set of discovery, 
defendants' motion to compel responses from Aurora to their 
second set of discovery, Aurora's motion to strike defendants' 
discovery, and defense counsel's motion to withdraw from 
representing LWD, the trial court entered an Order on April 8, 
2002, which in pertinent part ordered Aurora to "respond" to 
defendants' second set of discovery in thirty days, and provided 
that the trial court would appoint a special master, upon the 
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request of either party within thirty-five days, to resolve all 
the outstanding discovery disputes. See Order, R. 1754-56. Aurora 
timely filed its Response to Defendants' Second Set of Discovery, 
R. 1794-95, and timely filed its Request for Appointment of 
Special Master. R. 1790-93. 
Defendants then filed motions (1) to dismiss, (2) for 
summary judgment, and (3) for Rule 37 sanctions, all opposed by 
Aurora. Aurora filed a motion for partial summary judgment, 
opposed by defendants. Pleadings for these various motions begins 
at R. 1809 and run through R. 3259. The trial court failed to 
appoint the special master to resolve the discovery disputes as 
it had promised in its April 8, 2003 Order, and ultimately 
granted defendants' motion for Rule 37 sanctions and dismissed 
Aurora's claims with prejudice. R. 3276-79. Aurora's motion to 
alter or amend judgment was denied by Order dated November 10, 
2004. R. 3328-30. Notice of Appeal was filed by Aurora on 
December 9, 2004. R. 3331-36. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Aurora will first set forth the factual background of the 
circumstances giving rise to Aurora's filing this lawsuit, then 
set out the procedural actions which set the stage for the trial 
court's hearing on March 26, 2 003, the basis for the court's 
critical April 8, 2003 Order. 
As to the facts giving rise to this lawsuit, about the only 
fact recited by the Utah Supreme Court in opening its decision in 
Aurora I, supra, which has not been confirmed by undisputed 
evidence is the statement that by 1990 "LWD was in financial 
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trouble." Despite defendants' repeated insistance that LWD could 
not pay a small judgment creditor $4,000.00 and therefor "lost" 
the 3 million dollar property, no credible evidence has been 
produced to support that claim, and much evidence has been 
uncovered to refute it, and lead any reasonable person to the 
inescapable conclusion that, in fact, the Ogden-IRS property was 
the "cash cow" for LWD, and defendant Gay had no intention, and 
made no attempt, to "save" the property, but successfully schemed 
to misappropriate it for himself. The relevant facts, both 
presumed for the summary judgment review in Aurora I, along with 
more detailed facts uncovered by Aurora since that opinion in 
1998, are as follows: 
Sometime prior to 1990, Liberty West developed an office 
complex on real property in Ogden, Utah, which was and still is 
leased by the Internal Revenue Service (the "Ogden-IRS 
property"). R. 222, 227, 269. On November 21, 1990, the FDIC was 
assigned all right, title, and interest to certain Liberty West 
stock owned by James E. Hogle, Jr., then the president of Liberty 
West. R. 49, 73, 78, 269, 358, 363. The FDIC took possession of 
the stock to secure a debt Hogle owed a bank being liquidated by 
the FDIC pursuant to federal law. R. 49, 84, 269, 369. Defendant 
Gay was well aware of the Hogle pledge to the FDIC, having 
apparently suggested it to Hogle (Hogle letter to FDIC dated 
October 22, 1990, and found at R. 1209-10, among other places), 
having delivered to the FDIC the original Hogle stock certificate 
along with a corporate stock power executed by Hogle in favor of 
the FDIC (Gay cover letter and documents found at R. 1211-14, 
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among other places), and having had his secretary forward 
financial information on the Ogden-IRS property to the FDIC (R. 
1217-20, among other places). In February, 1991, Hogle further 
executed an Acknowledgment, Proxy and Power of Attorney in favor 
of the FDIC giving it all rights as stockholder, including the 
right to notice of, and to vote on, all corporate actions. R. 50, 
74, 84-5, 270, 359, 369-70. The stock was valued in a financial 
statement provided to the FDIC by Hogle at $200,000.00. R.50, 74, 
86, 270, 359, 371. The general understanding was that LWD was 
actively trying to sell the Ogden-IRS property, and pay the Hogle 
debt out of the profits expected. R. 1209-10. Those profits were 
expected to be in excess of $600,000.00. Letter at R. 2959-60. 
After receipt of the Hogle financial statement, no further 
communications from Hogle, Gay or LWD were provided to the FDIC, 
before or after the purported execution sale on May 15, 1991 
through the time of the sale of the Hogle asset to Aurora. FDIC 
Asset History, R. 2951-52; Defendants' answers to Request for 
Admission Nos. 1 & 2 at R. 2953. On or about November 13, 1991, 
Aurora purchased and was assigned the Hogle asset from the FDIC 
under the FDIC's mandate to liquidate failed bank assets pursuant 
to 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1820, 1823. R. 2955-57. On January 9, 1992, a 
formal assignment of the Hogle LWD stock interest was made from 
the FDIC to Aurora. R. 74, 90, 3 59, 375. Aurora immediately 
notified LWD and defendant Gay of the acquisition. R. 50, 74-5, 
91-2, 270-71, 359-60, 376-77. In April, 1993, Aurora formally 
foreclosed on the security in the Hogle stock. 
Thus, the evidence available to Aurora at the time of 
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bidding on the Hogle asset was: 
Hogle was president of LWD. LWD owned property leased 100% 
to the IRS. Hogle valued his shares at $2 00,000.00. LWD was 
actively trying to sell the property, expecting to net over 
$600,000.00 from any sale. Defendant Gay, the managing officer 
and director of LWD was well aware of the Hogle stock pledge, 
having apparently suggested it, having sent the Hogle stock 
certificate and stock or bond power to the FDIC, and having had 
his secretary send the FDIC some financial information on the IRS 
property. The FDIC's pledge agreement with Hogle and LWD provided 
that it had all rights under the stock (except possibly to sell 
it), including notice of all corporate actions and the right to 
vote the Hogle stock in any company decisions. 
Defendants continued to accept lease payments from the 
federal government, payable to the order of Liberty West 
Development well into at least October, 1994, R.51, 71-72, 272, 
347-48, and apparently at all times until the property was sold 
in 1998. Defendants further filed suit on behalf of LWD against 
Amcor on July 30, 1992, claiming to be the owner of the Ogden-IRS 
property. R. 51, 63-70, 271, 339-46. 
Then, on or about July 7, 1993, Gay for the first time 
alleged to Aurora's president that Liberty West no longer owned 
the Ogden-IRS property, but that it had been sold to another 
company of Gay's, XM International. He provided no explanation as 
to how this occurred without any notice to Aurora or the FDIC. R. 
51, 76, 272, 361. Shortly thereafter, Gay sent Aurora a copy of a 
title report which showed LWD as the legal titleholder of the 
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Ogden-IRS property as of the date of the report, December 4, 
1992. R. 51, 106-7, 272, 361, 391-92. No notice of impending 
sales, foreclosure or otherwise, was ever sent to the FDIC R. 
2951-52; 2953. 
Further investigation revealed that the property was 
purportedly "lost" to a small judgment creditor of LWD, 
Restaurant Store & Equipment Supply ("Restaurant Store"), which 
had foreclosed its lien via a sheriff's sale on May 15, 1991. R. 
16. Then, five days after the sheriff's sale, on May 20, 1991, 
Restaurant Store assigned its interest from the execution to XM. 
R. 16. Defendants have since admitted that defendant Gay had at 
least discussed the after-execution sale of the property to XM, 
if not actually come to such agreement, with the judgment 
creditor prior to the execution sale. See defendants' response to 
Request for Admission No. 3 at R. 2953-54. However, no sheriff's 
deed from that purported sale existed until January, 1993, and 
was not recorded until June 3, 1993. R. 252-53. A quit-claim deed 
from Restaurant Store to an entity purportedly named XM 
International was not executed until June 3, 1993, and recorded 
on June 11, 1993. R. 254. However, investigation also revealed 
that according to records of the Utah Department of Commerce, no 
entity by the name of XM International existed between June 9, 
1990, when a previous registration of that name expired, and 
October 26, 1993, when defendant XM's Articles of Organization 
were filed. R. 51-52, 267-68, 272-73, 351-52. In fact, prior to 
recording Articles of Organization, XM was merely the d/b/a of 
defendant Gay. R. 1188, ff 6, 7; accountant's record at R. 1231. 
8 
Other documents show that defendants paid Restaurant Store only 
$4,000.00 for the property. R. 249. Aurora has also discovered 
that the funds by which defendants purchased the property came 
from an account of Cougar International, another of defendant 
Gay's companies, which at the time owed LWD substantial amounts 
of money. R. 1187-88, f 5; 1229; 1199. Within a few months of 
this "purchase11 the property was appraised at $3,100,000.00. R. 
349-50, and generally netted defendants a good positive monthly 
cash flow, including $9,785.00 for the very month of the 
sheriff's sale. R. 12 01. The federal government continued to send 
lease payments for the Ogden-IRS property paid to the order of 
Liberty West, apparently all the way up to the time the property 
was sold in 1998. (Although defendants have claimed that the 
lease was changed over to XM in 1996, no evidence to establish 
this claim has been produced by defendants and Aurora, through a 
records deposition of Commercial Mortgage Associates, mortgage 
servicer for the mortgagee, Birkshire Life, discovered that lease 
payments for the last two years prior to the 1998 sale were still 
made out payable to LWD, but deposited into an account of another 
of defendant Gay's numerous companies, Projects West. R. 1391, 
1701-02, 1706.) 
Aurora made demand on defendants Gay and XM to return the 
property to Liberty West, and when defendants failed to do so, 
Aurora filed this lawsuit. 
As to the factual history of the discovery process herein, 
Aurora believes it has had to battle continual abuses of the 
discovery process by defendants and their various counsel. 
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As a quick recap regarding difficulties encountered by 
Aurora with its first set of discovery to defendants, Aurora was 
faced with defendants' inadequate first response which, among 
other things, objected to producing various documents pertaining 
to defendants Gay and XM because it was "private and personal by 
nature," See defendants' initial response, beginning at R. 198, 
attached to Aurora's Motion to Compel memo, beginning at R. 181. 
After Aurora's initial compel motion was granted, it faced 
problems such as a "Supplemental Response" which merely promised 
an actual response in 21 days (which was not done) R. 756-59; a 
"supplemental response" which was merely a letter from 
defendants' then-counsel, R. 83 3-35, and receipt of tax returns 
which were so obviously suspect that the court ordered defendants 
to submit forms to the IRS to produce tax returns directly to 
Aurora's counsel, which ultimately confirmed that less than half 
the returns produced by defendants were ever filed. See 2nd 
Hartman Affidavit at R. 952-58, f 12. 
Aurora ultimately decided to move on to its second set of 
discovery, served in early April, 2001, to obtain an accounting 
of the funds received by defendants under the IRS lease, 
information on defendant Gay's numerous other business entities, 
and so forth. Certificate of Service, R. 920. 
Defendants attempted to have Aurora's second set of 
discovery thrown out as being contrary to a prior scheduling 
order. R. 935-36. The trial court correctly denied defendants' 
request and ordered defendants' to respond. R. 1012-13. 
Defendants' response basically objected to virtually every 
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discovery request on the completely falacious basis that they had 
already answered the new discovery requests in their answers to 
the first set of discovery. R. 1034-64. Aurora brought another 
motion to compel while defendants sought summary judgment yet 
again. Compel, R. 1018-88; S.J., 1140-82. The trial court again 
correctly denied defendants' summary judgment motion, and granted 
Aurora's compel motion, ordering defendants to answer the 
discovery to the extent they were not explicitly answered 
previously, giving defendants a deadline of October 24, 2002. R. 
1304-08, 1317-18. On the eve of that deadline, defendants' 
current counsel appeared seeking Aurora to stipulate to his 
substitution and to an extension to file the response. Aurora 
declined, believing the trial court would have to make any such 
decision to amend its prior deadline order. The trial court 
allowed the substitution and granted an extension. R. 1376-81. 
Defendants then attempted to serve further discovery on 
Aurora, but mailed it to an incorrect address, a problem to which 
Aurora's counsel had previously drawn defense counsel's 
attention. See, Hartman Affidavit, R. 1568-71; Certificate of 
Service, R. 1384-85. When Aurora's counsel contacted defense 
counsel to advise him of the continuing address problem which 
caused significant delay in receiving the pleadings, he also 
advised defense counsel that Aurora would, within the next week, 
be filing a motion for a protective order or to strike the 
further discovery by defendants because of their repeated 
representations that they were done with discovery. Hartman 
Affid. at R. 1568-71. Defendants, though knowing that their 
11 
attempted service was defective, then made a run to the 
courthouse with a motion to compel. R. 1475-1536. Aurora, as 
promised, filed its Motion to Strike, R. 1537-60, along with a 
now-necessary memo in opposition to defendants' compel motion. R. 
1568-84. 
In the meantime, defendants produced their "response" to 
Aurora's second set of discovery. Certificate of Service, R. 
1382-83; Copy of response, R. 1396-1430, attached as Exhibit A to 
Aurora's Objection to Adequacy thereof, R. 1386-1395. Pursuant to 
the trial court's August 15, 2002, Memorandum Decision and Order 
granting Aurora's compel motion and denying defendants' summary 
judgment motion, R. 1304-08, Aurora filed its Objection to the 
Adequacy of those responses and requested a hearing. R. 1386-
1430. The Objection to Adequacy cited several specific objections 
to answers to interrogatories, including a continuing refusal to 
provide any information to account for the use of the lease 
monies received by defendants, and objected generally to 
defendants' continuing use of objections and a protective order 
demand, and, most significantly, defendants' completely 
impermissible attempts to use the business records option of Rule 
33(d) to avoid providing any substantive answers to the 
interrogatories (as well as requests for production of 
documents). Each Rule 33(d) offer was qualified by the phrase "to 
the extent they are in the Defendants' possession, custody, or 
control," and by their General Objections No. 9 which states, "By 
responding or objecting to any discovery request, Defendants do 
not thereby intend to represent, nor do Defendant [sic] 
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represent, that any particular document or information in fact 
exists or has ever existed in Defendants' possession, custody or 
control." R. 1398. Either of these "qualifications" disqualify 
the use of Rule 33(d). See Objection to Adequacy argument and 
authorities at R. 1387-90. 
Following the usual exchange of pleadings as to defendants' 
"compel" motion and Aurora's Motion to Strike, a hearing was set 
for March 26, 2 003, to resolve those opposing motions, as well as 
an attempt by defense counsel to withdraw as counsel for the 
nominal defendant LWD, and the still pending question of the 
adequacy of defendants' responses to Aurora's second set of 
discovery. (Aurora had filed an Addendum to Objection to Adequacy 
of Discovery Responses, R. 1699-1709, prior to the hearing after 
finally being able to search the boxes of documents provided by 
defendants. It confirmed that defendants' attempted use of Rule 
33(d) to respond to the interrogatories was completely improper, 
that there were virtually no responsive records for numerous 
discovery requests, including the critical accounting and 
business entity information requests necessary for Aurora to 
establish all its direct damages and its constructive trust 
claim. Some of the few responsive documents produced actually 
contradicted defendants' express answers. R. 1702.) It was out of 
this hearing that the critical Order of April 8, 2 003, arose. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Aurora contends that the trial court committed reversible 
error in striking Aurora's pleadings and dismissing its claims 
herein with prejudice under purported authority of Rule 37, Utah 
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R. Civ. Pro. Aurora contends that the court's ruling was 
erroneous for three distinct reasons: (1) that the trial court's 
ruling was based on a legally erroneous order purportedly 
granting defendants' motion to compel, (2) that the trial court 
made the erroneous legal conclusion that Aurora even negligently, 
let alone willfully or in any other culpable manner, violated the 
court's April 8, 2003 Order, and (3) should the appeals court 
reject these first two legal bases (correction of error/no 
deference standard), that the trial court abused its discretion 
in imposing the ultimate sanction of dismissal under the 
circumstances of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TO THE EXTENT TRIAL COURT'S APRIL 8, 2 003 
ORDER PURPORTS TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO COMPEL, IT IS ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The critical error which set the stage for the trial court's 
ultimate dismissal of Aurora's claims herein was its decision to 
use as a starting point defendants' proposed order from the March 
26, 2003 hearing, and leave in the ruling that defendants' motion 
to compel was "granted." This portion of the April 8, 2003 Order 
is clearly erroneous under the law, and set up the domino effect 
of wrongfully providing a purported basis for the trial court to 
even consider the severe sanction of dismissal ultimately 
entered. 
As demonstrated in Aurora's memorandum in opposition to 
defendants' compel motion and exhibits, and admitted by 
defendants' own Certificate of Service filed with the court to 
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reflect their attempt to serve such discovery on Aurora's 
counsel, it is entirely clear that defendants' attempt at service 
of said discovery was defective and improper and cannot be the 
basis for the sanctions sought by defendants in their motion to 
compel. 
How service is accomplished is governed by Rule 5, Utah 
R. Civ. Pro., which provides, in pertinent part: 
Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other 
papers• ••• 
(b) Service: How made and by whom. 
(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or 
permitted to be made upon a party represented by an 
attorney the service shall be made upon the attorney 
unless service upon the party is ordered by the court. 
Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made 
by delivering a copy or by mailing a copy to the last 
known address or, if no address is known, by leaving it 
with the clerk of the court. 
Rule 5(b)(1), Utah R. Civ. Pro. 
There should be no dispute that since early fall of 
2001, the last known address of plaintiff's counsel on file 
herein is 2558 South Wilshire Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109. 
Aside from having filed a change of address notification with the 
court and having served defendants' prior counsel a copy thereof, 
it is believed that any pleadings or written communications from 
plaintiff and directed to defendants' counsel, current or prior, 
since that change of address have contained the same 2558 South 
Wilshire Circle street address. This would certainly suffice to 
impute knowledge of this "last known address" to defendants' 
counsel. But beyond that, defendants' counsel was twice notified 
that they were using an incorrect street address for service on 
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plaintiff's counsel, the first time believed to be in November, 
2002, and the second time on January 10, 2 003. See Hartman 
affidavit, R. 1568-73. 
Therefore, there can be no dispute that the last known 
address of plaintiff's counsel, 2558 South Wilshire Circle, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84109, was known by defendants' counsel, and 
their failure to use that address in their attempted service of 
the discovery does not meet the requirements of Rule 5, and was 
fatally defective. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 
142 (5th Cir. 1996)(District clerk's mailing of the notice to an 
address it knew from its own documents to be invalid does not 
satisfy the requirements of Rule 5.); J.D. Pharmaceuticals v. 
Sav-On Drugs & Cosmetics, 893 F.2d 1201, 1208 (11th Cir. 
1990)(Requests to Admit need to be mailed to last known address 
to constitute valid service.); Timmons v. United States, 194 F.2d 
357, 360 (4th Cir. 1952)(strictest and most exacting compliance 
required when using service by mail); United States v. Brandt, 8 
F.R.D. 163, 165-66 (D.C. Mont 1948)(same); Biorlin v. United S. 
S. Co., 10 F.R.D. 42, 43 (N.D. Ohio 1950)(In absence of service 
of interrogatory requesting information, court could not compel 
discovery of information.); Merchant's Grocery Co. v. Merchant's 
Trust & Banking Co., 80 So. 494, 495 (Miss. 1919)(Ineffective 
service of interrogatories imposes no duty on [receiving party] 
to answer.) Although not involving service by mail, Utah's courts 
have also upheld the principle that service must rigorously 
conform to the rules to be a valid basis on which a court may 
act. Southland Construction v. Semnani, 20 P.3d 875 (Utah 
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2001)(Utah Supreme Court unanimously reversed Court of Appeals' 
and trial court's refusal to set aside a default judgment where 
the affidavit of service was inadequate to establish proper 
service under the requirements of Rule 5, Utah R. Civ. Pro.). 
The discovery for which defendants sought to compel a 
response from Aurora, Interrogatories and Requests for Production 
of Documents, are governed, respectively, by Rules 3 3 and 34, 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. Quite appropriately, both discovery rules 
provide that the process of submitting the interrogatories (Rule 
33) or production requests (Rule 34) must begin by service on the 
other party. Rule 33, Utah R. Civ. Pro. ("...any party may serve 
upon any other party... . " ) ; Rule 34, Utah R. Civ. Pro. ("Any 
party may serve on any other party... .")(emphasis added). 
Only parties who are properly served are required to 
respond within the time set out in the respective rules. Rule 
33(b)(3) ("The party upon whom the interrogatories have been 
served shall serve a copy of the answers and objections,... . " ) ; 
Rule 34(b)(2) ("The party upon whom the request is served shall 
serve a written response... .")(emphasis added). 
Finally, Rule 37, Utah R. Civ. Pro., governs compel 
motions and sanctions thereunder. A compel motion as to 
interrogatories and requests for production will lie only when 
properly submitted under Rules 33 and 34, respectively, which 
submission, as seen above, requires proper service under Rule 5 
on the party sought to be compelled. Rule 37(a)(2)(B). This 
requirement of proper service being a prerequisite to seeking 
court assistance in compelling a discovery response is further 
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emphasized in subsection (d) of Rule 37, which provides: 
(d) ... If a party ... fails ... (2) to serve 
answers or objections to interrogatories submitted 
under Rule 33, after proper service of the 
interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to 
a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after 
proper service of the request, the court in which the 
action is pending on motion may make such orders ... . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Thus, it is clear that defendants' attempted service of 
their discovery was defective and improper, did not trigger any 
obligation on the part of plaintiff to respond thereto, and 
cannot be the basis for granting a motion to compel nor imposing 
any sanctions upon plaintiff. United States v. Brandt, supra. 
Defendants cited absolutely no legal authority to support 
their argument of some undefined "actual notice" standard, except 
to willfully misrepresent the holding of the J. D. 
Pharmaceuticals case, supra, which is entirely supportive of 
Aurora's position. In fact, it can be readily surmised that 
defendants knew full well that their attempted service of the 
discovery was fatally defective, since their race-to-the-
courthouse compel motion memorandum contains no allegation that 
the discovery was ever served, but instead talks about having 
"propounded" the discovery. See defendants7 compel memo at R. 
1476, L. 3; R. 1477, 1st sentence of Point II. 
The court was therefor without authority to grant 
defendants' Motion to Compel Discovery Response, and only had 
authority to allow defendants to go forward with additional 
discovery, which is, coincidentally, just what the trial court 
stated in its ruling from the bench. See ruling part of 
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transcript of hearing at R. 3347, p. 33, L.4 - p. 34, L. 9. Thus, 
the question before the trial court was not about the sufficiency 
of any responses of Aurora or the propriety of the discovery 
requests sought by defendants, as would be the usual case in a 
compel motion, but only whether the trial court should allow the 
defendants to conduct further discovery at all. Transcript at R. 
3347, p. 28, L. 3-9. 
The consequence of this clear error resulted in the posture 
of the case being entirely different a year later, when the court 
should have only been in a position to entertain a motion to 
compel (or refer the matter to the special master, as promised in 
the April 8, 2003 Order) instead of a motion for the severe 
sanctions requested by defendants and ultimately entered by the 
court for purportedly "violating" the order "granting" the 
defendants7 compel motion. 
Under Utah law, basing a sanction on an order which is 
legally erroneous constitutes an abuse of discretion. Morton v. 
Continental Bakincr Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997). Therefor, 
the Court of Appeals must reverse the court's dismissal of 
Aurora's claims herein. 
POINT II 
TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT AURORA 
VIOLATED ITS APRIL 8, 2003 ORDER 
IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
The second legal error by the trial court was its conclusion 
that Aurora had violated the court's April 8, 2003 Order. 
The court's April 8, 2 004 Order required Aurora to "respond" 
to defendants' second set of discovery within thirty days. This 
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Order was entered following the court's consideration of, among 
other matters, defendants' Motion to Compel, along with Aurora's 
opposition thereto, together with Aurora's Motion to Strike 
Defendants' Discovery, along with defendants' opposition thereto. 
Aurora's opposition to defendants' compel motion was primarily 
based on the undisputed fact that the service of the discovery 
was defective, using an incorrect address, not the "last known 
address" of Aurora's counsel. Defendants argued essentially that 
since Aurora's counsel eventually received the discovery, the 
service was proper, but defendants could not cite a single 
reported decision which supported their theory. Aurora's strike 
motion argued that defendants should be judicially estopped from 
more discovery because of their numerous previous representations 
to the court that their discovery was completed. Defendants' 
argument against Aurora's strike motion was that because their 
strategy to dispose of the case on technical issues was 
unsuccessful, they would like to renew their discovery. 
Thus, as shown above, the issue the court addressed was 
really whether defendants should be allowed to conduct more 
discovery at all. At the hearing on March 26, 2 003, the court 
orally ruled that it was going to allow defendants to conduct 
additional discovery, that Aurora had thirty days to respond to 
defendants' discovery, and that the court would appoint a special 
master to resolve outstanding discovery disputes should either 
party so request within thirty-five days. Defendants' proposed 
Order was objected to by Aurora, and while the objection was 
pending, defendants filed a Motion to Expedite Discovery asking 
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the court to shorten the time for Aurora to respond, and that 
Aurora be denied the opportunity to object to any of the 
discovery. The court, without even waiting for Aurora's response, 
summarily denied defendants' Motion to Expedite, R. 1758-60, and 
signed an interlineated Order requiring Aurora to "respond" to 
the discovery. 
The first requirement to imposing sanctions under Rule 
37(b)(2) is that a discovery order must have been violated. An 
essential predicate to this requirement is that the order 
allegedly violated must be specific and unambiguous, Joseph, 
Sanctions: The Federal Law of Litigation Abuse, § 48 at p. 583 
(3d ed. 1994), and must give adequate notice of the duties it 
imposes. 7 Moore's Federal Practice, §37.42[5] (3d ed. 1997). As 
stated in Moore's, 
"Indeed, the purpose of the prior order requirement is to 
ensure that the party to whom the order is directed both 
understands his or her obligations, and has an opportunity 
to contest the discovery sought before being exposed to 
sanctions. If the terms of a discovery order are too vague 
or general to give fair notice of its obligations, it cannot 
support sanctions." 
Id. at p. 37-66. See also, Hathcock v. Navistar Intern. Transp. 
Corp., 53 F. 3d 36, 40-41 (4th Cir. 1995)(default sanction was an 
abuse of discretion where court had issued no specific order 
compelling the discovery of materials to which defendant 
objected, but only claimed a violation of general scheduling 
orders which could not have given defendant notice of obligations 
and consequences of a purported violation); R. W. Intern. Corp. 
v. Welch Foods, Inc., 937 F.2d 11, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1991)(court 
could not infer or imply from general scheduling order an order 
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to answer specific deposition questions; without specific 
explicit court order under Rule 37(a), court lacked legal 
authority to dismiss the case under R. 37(b)(2)); Salahuddin v. 
Harris, 782 F.2d 1127, 1131-33 (2nd Cir. 1986)(Rule 37(b) 
sanctions require violation of an explicit court order and court 
cannot infer or imply such an order from a Rule 3 0 order to be 
deposed); support, Shepherd v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 
62 F.3d 1469, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
So, the Court of Appeals must determine whether Aurora 
actually violated the trial court's April 8, 2003 Order. Aurora 
frankly believes that the order is not so much ambiguous as that 
it simply cannot support the interpretation argued by defendants, 
and apparently adopted by the trial court, under the express 
language of the order and the circumstances giving rise to the 
order. 
The language of the order simply provides that Aurora 
"respond" to the defendants' discovery within thirty days. As is 
readily apparent from the rules of civil procedure pertaining to 
discovery, a "response" means either an answer or an objection. 
As to interrogatories, a leading treatise has stated that 
"answers and objections are to be served together. In this way 
there should be a response in one fashion or the other to each 
interrogatory and a failure to respond can be readily noted." 8A 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2173 at p.290-91 
(2nd ed. 1994). Similarly, the same treatise notes that, as to 
requests for production, "the responding party may object to some 
or all of the discovery sought." Id. in § 2213 at p. 427. Even 
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more clear is the express languaqe of Rule 34(b), which provides, 
in pertinent part: 
The response shall state, with respect to each item or 
category, that inspection and related activities will be 
permitted as requested, unless the request is objected to, 
in which event the reasons for objection shall be stated. 
Rule 34(b)(2), Utah R. Civ. Pro. 
Thus, the plain language does not support any other 
conclusion than that Aurora quite properly raised objections to a 
number of defendants' discovery requests. Nor do the 
circumstances at the time of the order support any other 
conclusion. As previously stated, at the March 26, 2 003 hearing 
the court was primarily deciding whether to allow defendants to 
conduct further discovery at all. No ruling was made as to the 
propriety of specific discovery requests, nor, of course, were 
any responses by Aurora before the court at that time. But 
additionally, the court was scheduled to look at Aurora's 
objections as to the adequacy of defendants' own responses to 
Aurora's second set of discovery. See Aurora's initial Objection 
to Adequacy at R. 1386-1430 and its Addendum to that objection at 
R. 1699-1709. After the court's limited time was spent on the 
question as to whether to allow defendants to conduct more 
discovery and the question of defense counsel's attempt to 
withdraw as counsel for LWD, the trial court responded to 
Aurora's counsel's concern as to how the court was going to 
handle Aurora's outstanding objections to defendants' discovery 
responses by making its ruling. R. 3347, p.33, L. 1 - p. 35, L. 
15. It seems quite obvious to Aurora that the trial court's 
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ruling allowed sufficient time for each party to evaluate the 
opposing party's discovery response and determine whether those 
responses were satisfactory, and if not, request appointment of 
the special master. Id. Aurora already had grounds to have the 
special master appointed, and within thirty days Aurora's 
responses would be due such that defendants would have five days 
to decide whether they themselves would ask for the special 
master appointment. Clearly, the special master request provision 
was to apply to both sides. As the court expressly stated, "If 35 
days from today, I hear from either side that there is a [sic] 
issue concerning dispute about discovery, we will appear here, I 
will appoint a special master, which [sic] will settle all 
discovery issues... ." R. 3347, p. 33, L. 17-20. The actual 
written order entered provided that the trial court would 
"appoint a Special Master to preside over all pre-trial discovery 
disputes." R. 1754-57. Also of significant interest to the 
question of the court's intention in its April 8, 2003 Order is 
the activity between the hearing and entry of the written order. 
Aurora objected to defendants' proposed order, primarily 
concerned about the provision stating that the trial court 
"granted" defendants' compel motion, since the trial court did 
not state that in its ruling from the bench and since the service 
of the motion was clearly defective and, under unanimous legal 
authority, could not be a basis for a compel order or for 
sanctions. As noted above, during the time the trial court was 
considering Aurora's objection, defendants, apparently 
unsatisfied with the terms of their own proposed order, moved the 
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court enter an order shortening the time for Aurora to respond 
and ruling that Aurora had waived any right to object to any of 
defendants' discovery requests. R. 1740-49. Without even waiting 
for a response from Aurora, the court summarily rejected the 
belated request of defendants by writing "denied" across 
defendants' proposed order to expedite and sent it out to the 
parties. R. 1758-60. Thus, even though Aurora was already 
convinced from the bench ruling and the written order entered 
that the court's ruling did not deprive it of exercising its 
right to object to any discovery requests which it believed were 
improper, the court's summary denial of defendants' express 
request to deny Aurora those rights certainly more than confirmed 
that interpretation in the minds of Aurora and its counsel. 
Aurora complied with the court's April 8, 2 003 Order by 
filing a Request for Special Master on May 5, 2003, R. 1790-93, 
and serving defendants with its discovery responses on May 7, 
2003. Certificate of Service, R. 1794-95. Those discovery 
responses included several objections, which defendants had ample 
time to request a special master to resolve. Instead, defendants 
themselves violated the April 8, 2003 Order by ignoring the 
provisions therein and instead subsequently filing a separate 
motion for Rule 37 sanctions, suggesting in mock outrage that 
Aurora had willfully violated the Order by raising objections 
instead of providing everything which defendants requested. 
And Aurora's objections were hardly frivolous. A few 
examples will be illustrative. For one, defendants asked in 
Interrogatories 7 & 8 and Requests for Production 10, 11, 12, and 
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13 for Aurora to conduct extensive searches of all asset packages 
ever purchased, and identify ones which may have had a security 
agreement present, and to supply all documents therefrom, or to 
provide information and documents from the other assets purchased 
with the Hogle asset. Clearly, these other asset purchases have 
no relevance to the claims made herein, and the requests are 
about the most extreme example of a "fishing expedition" as one 
can imagine. Naturally, Aurora objected on relevance grounds. In 
several other interrogatories, defendants asked, for each claim 
individually, the classic, overbroad blanket request for "all 
facts, persons knowledgeable, and documents" supporting Aurora's 
claims. Moore's Federal Practice flatly states that this type of 
interrogatory constitutes discovery abuse. Moore's, supra, at § 
33.74. Aurora objected on the bases of overbreadth, imposing an 
undue burden, repetitive and cumulative. Thus, defendants 
constructed ten interrogatories to discover facts on which 
Aurora's claims are based, despite knowing full well that the 
basic fact situation which gave rise to essentially all of 
Aurora's claims is pretty simple and straightforward: defendant 
Gay, knowing the Hogle stock was pledged to the FDIC, laundered 
the sole significant asset of LWD through a set-up sheriff's sale 
to his own use, benefit and ownership and concealed his actions 
by failing to advise the FDIC, failing to record any deed 
demonstrating the change of ownership, and continuing to operate 
the lease to the IRS under the LWD identity. Despite objecting, 
Aurora cited numerous previous discovery responses in which it 
had provided such information to defendants. A third example is 
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defendants' request for calculations of Aurora's damages. 
Defendants know that the primary direct damages to Aurora are 
from the loss of the property and the loss of the income stream 
from the IRS lease. Defendants also are fully aware that Aurora 
cannot provide any response as to the loss of the income stream 
from the property due to defendants' continuing refusal to 
provide the accounting information requested by Aurora and which 
issue the special master would have resolved. A final 
illustrative example is defendants' requests for all of Aurora's 
(and apparently counsel's) notes from conversations with various 
persons, including defendant Gay and others with a background 
with LWD, Gay or XM. Aurora objected on the basis that its 
president's notes from conversations with defendant Gay (or the 
others) were protected under the limited privilege of the work 
product rule. Defendants have attempted to make very much hay of 
this privilege claim by Aurora, and have flatly claimed that the 
notes cannot be work product. Defendants cite no authority for 
that position, which seems to be common practice for them, and 
Aurora believes that these notes quite clearly meet the three-
part definition of "work product": 1. they are documents and 
tangible things, 2. prepared in anticipation of litigation or for 
trial, 3. by or for another party or for that party's 
representative. Parts 1 and 3 of this work product "test" are 
self-evident. Part 2 is met in this instance in that these notes 
were pursuant to Aurora's attempts to collect on the Hogle debt, 
which debt was a judgment against Hogle secured by Hogle's stock 
in Liberty West. Aurora's procedure in collecting on a judgment 
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is to first file the judgment in the state of the debtor's 
domicile. Aurora did just that in this case by filing a foreign 
judgment against Hogle in 1992, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, by Assignee Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. James E. 
Hogle, Jr. et al., Civil No. 926913406 FJ in Salt Lake's Third 
District Court. Thus, these notes are clearly protected by the 
work product doctrine. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power 
Supply, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 532 (D.C. Ind. 1999)(witness statements 
and summaries of witness interviews prepared by non-party insurer 
are protected by work product); Havden v. Acadian Gas Pipeline 
Sys., 173 F.R.D. 429 (D.C. La. 1997)(notes and memo prepared by 
employee of corporation engaged in initial investigation of the 
plaintiff's claims against corporation are work product). 
Then, when Aurora became aware of the defendants' purported 
"need" for these documents, it was even more obvious that they 
should not have to be produced. Defendants passionately argued 
that the notes of Aurora's president's conversations with 
defendant Gay were the most critical evidence on the issue of 
fraudulent concealment. However, any careful reading of the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Aurora I demonstrates that those 
conversations are completely irrelevant to the issue of 
fraudulent concealment. The Utah Supreme Court's holding on that 
issue is whether, despite concealment of the disposal of the 
Ogden-IRS property, "a reasonable person would nonetheless have 
discovered the wrongdoing, in this case, before purchasing the 
Hogle judgment." Aurora I, supra, at 1279 (emphasis added). There 
is no dispute that all conversations of Aurora's president with 
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defendant Gay (or any of the other persons) occurred after Aurora 
purchased the Hogle asset, making the notes from those 
conversations completely irrelevant to the issue of fraudulent 
concealment. 
Defendants' discovery requests appear to have been written 
with the sole purpose to elicit the obvious objections in order 
to create some issue for defendants. Unfortunately, the ploy 
appears to have taken in the trial court• 
For the reasons shown above, the court's conclusion of law 
that Aurora's timely filing of a written response which included 
both answers and objections somehow violated its April 8, 2003 
Order is clearly erroneous. The only violation of that April 8 
Order was by defendants in seeking a separate sanctions motion 
when the subject thereof was clearly within the scope of the 
court's promise to appoint the special master - and perhaps the 
trial court's own failure to keep that promise. Certainly the 
court's erroroneous legal conclusion that Aurora violated its 
April 8, 2003 Order and imposing any sanction based on that 
erroneous legal conclusion constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997). 
Again, for this reason alone, the trial court's dismissal of 
Aurora's claims herein must be reversed. 
POINT III 
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, TRIAL COURT'S APRIL 8, 2 003 
ORDER AS TO GRANTING COMPEL MOTION WAS LEGALLY 
CORRECT AND ITS CONCLUSION AURORA VIOLATED THAT 
ORDER WAS ALSO CORRECT, IT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN IMPOSING SANCTION OF DISMISSAL 
Although trial courts possess discretion in imposing 
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appropriate penalties for violation of discovery orders, that 
discretion is not without limits. 8A Wright & Miller, supra, § 
2284; U. S. v. Certain Real Property Locaterd at Route 1, 126 
F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 1997). Rule 37 itself provides the 
overriding direction that the court make such orders "as are 
just" against a party that violates an order compelling 
discovery. R. 37(b)(2), Utah R. Civ. Pro.; Chudasama v. Mazda 
Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1366 (11th Cir. 1997). 
Aurora obviously believes that it did not violate the 
court's order to "respond" to the discovery in the first 
instance, for the reasons discussed in Point II, above. However, 
assuming for the sake of argument that the court could conclude 
that such a violation occurred, under the facts and circumstances 
herein it is apparent that the sanction imposed on plaintiff of 
striking its amended complaint and dismissing its claims 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
Those facts and circumstances included the following: (1) 
the trial court never ruled on Aurora's objections to defendants' 
discovery requests, or on the general propriety of the requests; 
(2) Aurora had before the court its own very significant 
objections to the adequacy of defendants' own discovery 
responses, which the court apparently never even considered, let 
alone ruled on; (3) Aurora had before the court a motion for 
partial summary judgment which the court did not rule on, and 
which showed by defendants' memorandum in opposition that 
defendants could not actually dispute Aurora's material factual 
allegations; and (4) the record herein was repleat with a history 
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of discovery abuse on the part of defendants, beyond those 
addressed by Aurora's then-pending objections to the adequacy of 
defendants' discovery responses. The court apparently considered 
none of these issues in imposing dismissal on Aurora. 
Utah has limited the trial court's discretion in imposing 
the sanction of dismissal in that it may not be imposed in the 
absence of "willfulness, bad faith, or fault.11 Utah Dept. of 
Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995). Further, a 
trial court's range of discretion is more narrow when it imposes 
the ultimate sanction of dismissal than when it imposes less 
severe sanctions. Id. at 8. Support, Chudasama, supra, at 12 3 
F.3d 1366; Continental Insurance v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage, 59 
Fed.Appx. 830, 841 (7th Cir. 2003); Lirette v. Babin Farm, Inc., 
843 So.2d 1141, 1143 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2003)(the record must 
contain sufficient evidence of plaintiff's willful disobedience, 
bad faith, or fault in order to justify dismissal). Aurora 
believes there is no evidence of willfulness, bad faith, or fault 
by plaintiff or its counsel in this case. How could Aurora have 
expected that the court, in ordering it to "respond" to the 
discovery, apparently did not use that term in the manner in 
which it is normally used in the discovery rules, especially when 
the court contemporaneously and summarily denied defendants' 
motion to expedite, which contained the very interpretation of 
its order which the trial court apparently has now adopted after 
the fact? 
One of the purposes of modern rules of procedure is to 
assure that disputes are decided on the merits whenever possible. 
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Chudasama, supra. The court's discretion must be balanced against 
the priority of affording disputants an opportunity to be heard 
and to do justice between them. Rohan v. Boseman, 46 P.3d 753 
(Ut.App. 2002). Justice requires that the most drastic sanctions 
be reserved for flagrant cases, Wright & Miller, supra, § 2284 at 
p. 62 3. This is hardly such a case, at least as it concerns 
Aurora's conduct. 
Utah has set out some factors to consider in determining 
whether sanctions are merited, including (1) whether the party's 
behavior was willful; (2) whether the party has acted in bad 
faith; (3) whether the court can attribute some fault to the 
party; and (4) whether the party has engaged in persistent 
dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the judicial process. 
Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 276 (Utah 1997). 
Contrary to defendants' blanket declaration in their memorandum 
at R. 3 3 07, none of these are found herein. As to the 
"willfulness" of Aurora's actions, as shown above, Aurora did not 
violate the court's April 8, 2003 Order, but responded as 
directed by the court and its interpretation of that order was 
correct and entirely reasonable under the circumstances from the 
hearing, the court's bench ruling, and the express language of 
the Order. As to bad faith, defendants' repeated allegations of 
"broken promises" are simply unsupported in the record. The 
purported "promise" made during Aurora's president's deposition 
is a red herring: First of all, during a deposition is not an 
appropriate time to make a request for production of documents -
Rule 34 sets out the procedure to make such a request. Second, 
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the "promise" was a statement by Aurora's counsel that Aurora 
might be able to provide those notes to the extent they were not 
subject to a privilege, which they were, work product. Third, 
shortly after the deposition during which the request was made, 
defendants' then-counsel filed a Certificate of Readiness for 
Trial stating that defendants' discovery was complete. And 
finally, defendants' only assertion of the need for those notes 
was to address the fraudulent concealment issue; yet the Utah 
Supreme Court's holding in Aurora I clearly established that 
those notes are completely irrelevant to the fraudulent 
concealment issue. As to fault of the party, defendant points to 
Aurora's president's failure to bring those notes to his resumed 
deposition as evidence of fault. This ignores the fact that 
defendant's counsel gave absolutely no direction in his Notices 
of Deposition as to what he desired Mr. Zak to bring with him or 
what topics Zak should be prepared to testify about; and it 
ignores the fact that the question of the production of those 
documents was at the time awaiting resolution by the special 
master which the court had promised to appoint to resolve 
discovery disputes such as this one. Finally, as to persistent 
dilatory tactics, defendants only summarily conclude that such a 
pattern exists without citing anything to support such a claim. 
If the Court wants to see persistent dilatory tactics, look at 
defendants' conduct over the course of this case as set forth 
above in the Statement of Facts, most particularly the fact that 
defendants never did make any meaningful responses to Aurora's 
second set of discovery to defendants which were served in April 
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2001, and which they were twice compelled to do by the trial 
court! 
Similarly, federal courts in our 10th Circuit have cited 
five factors in determining whether dismissal of a plaintiff's 
action is an appropriate sanction: 1. the degree of actual 
prejudice to defendant; 2. the amount of interference with the 
judicial process; 3. the culpability of plaintiff; 4. whether the 
court warned plaintiff in advance that dismissal would be likely 
as a sanction for noncompliance; and 5. the efficacy of lesser 
sanctions. Archibeque v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 70 
F.3d 1172, 1174 (10th Cir. 1995); Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 
337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994). It is apparent in reviewing the facts 
and circumstances of this action that these factors do not 
support the sanction of dismissal. As to those factors which are 
not duplicative of the Utah points, above, there was no prejudice 
to defendants and no disruption to the judicial process since the 
court had set up the special master provision to resolve any such 
remaining discovery disputes. As to the efficacy of lesser 
sanctions, there is no real indication that the court considered 
any other options. Aurora believes that, in light of the law set 
out above in Point I, the only sanction available under the 
circumstances was to order answers and award attorney fees. 
However, the court had already set up the provision to appoint a 
special master, and the matter should have been referred to him 
or her to resolve. As to any warning, there was none. Thus, the 
factors used in the 10th Circuit all weigh against the court's 
order of dismissal of Aurora's claims and support a conclusion 
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that the court abused its discretion in ordering the dismissal. 
This conclusion is particularly compelling when the court's 
ruling is viewed in light of the procedural posture of the case 
as recited above. The same April 8, 2003 Order of the trial court 
promised the parties hereto that upon request it would appoint a 
special master to review and recommend resolution of all 
outstanding discovery disputes. This provision of the court's 
March 26, 2 003 bench ruling, on which the April 8, 2 003 Order was 
based, was because at the time of the hearing, the court was also 
addressing Aurora's motion to strike defendants' second set of 
discovery, as well as the adequacy of defendants' responses to 
Aurora's second set of discovery, which the court had twice 
compelled defendants' to answer, and the adequacy of which 
answers Aurora had objected to, and subsequently supplemented 
said objection. Aurora complied with the court's Order by timely 
filing its Request for Appointment of Special Master. So, while 
Aurora awaited the court's appointment of a Special Master as the 
court had promised in its April 8, 2003 Order and March 26, 2003 
bench ruling, defendants went ahead and ignored that portion of 
the court's ruling and proceeded with their Motion for Rule 37 
Sanctions. Thus, if any party herein can be said to have violated 
the April 8, 2003 Order, it is defendants. 
Although the trial court has the discretion to reconsider or 
modify its prior rulings in a case prior to the entry of a final 
judgment, that discretion is limited to situations where such 
change does not harm a party. Commonwealth v. Fosterf 585 N.E.2d 
331, 334 (Mass. 1992); support, U.P.C., Inc.v. R.O.A. General, 
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Inc. , 990 P.2d 945, 958 (Ut.App. 1999)(reason for seeking 
revision of prior order must be demonstrated). In this case, 
Aurora was clearly harmed by the court's failure to abide by its 
prior promise to appoint a special master to resolve discovery 
disputes, when it ignored its promise as to the special master, 
apparently ignored Aurora's pending objections to the adequacy of 
defendants' discovery response, and entertained and granted 
defendants' motion for Rule 37 sanctions even though that motion 
of defendants was clearly within the sphere of review for which 
the special master was to be appointed. For this reason alone an 
appellate court should find an abuse of discretion herein, and 
for this reason alone the trial court should have set aside its 
Order of July 13, 2 004, and referred the discovery disputes to a 
special master as it had promised. 
Furthermore, although defendants have suggested that whether 
another party has engaged in discovery abuse such as by failing 
to answer interrogatories or produce documents should have no 
bearing on whether sanctions imposed on the opponent are 
justified, that is clearly a gross overstatement. First of all, 
such a broad statement is contrary to the mandate to fashion such 
orders "as are just." And it is contrary to considerable 
decisional authority. The Seventh Circuit in the Continental 
Insurance case, supra, found that the trial court therein abused 
its discretion by imposing sanctions without even considering 
Continental's objections to the discovery. In a decision that has 
much in common with this case, the Seventh Circuit stated: 
A district court must consider relevant objections. In this 
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case, the district court's refusal to consider Continental's 
challenges to the discovery requests unduly burdened 
Comtinental by requiring it to respond to extensive 
discovery requests involving irrelevant evidence. 
Id. at 59 Fed.Appx. 839. This is certainly applicable to 
defendants' numerous requests regarding other asset purchases by 
Aurora and the requests for Aurora's notes from conversations 
with defendant Gay and others. The former are clearly irrelevant 
to this case, and the latter is irrelevant for the purposes 
requested under the holding in Aurora I. The Seventh Circuit also 
found an abuse of discretion by the trial court in compelling 
Continental to respond to a discovery request without considering 
its ability to do so: 
[T]he district court should have considered the fact that 
Continental needed access to documents within the 
defendants' possession in order to fully respond to the 
defendants' discovery requests. ... Continental could only 
provide complete responses after it had the opportunity to 
review the defendants' files to determine what 
documentation the defendants had, but had not forwarded to 
Continental. 
Id. Similarly herein, Aurora could not provide any complete 
response as to its damages herein when defendants continued to 
refuse to provide any accounting as to what it did with lease 
monies which rightfully belonged to LWD, and Aurora could not 
provide complete witness information when defendants refused to 
provide information as to persons involved in defendant Gay's 
numerous business entities which may have benefitted from his 
looting of LWD's rightful funds. 
Thus, even if it could be concluded that the trial court's 
April 8, 2003 Order could grant the defdendants' motion to compel 
its unserved discovery (it can't), and even if it could be 
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concluded that Aurora somehow violated that Order (it can't), 
when the trial has established in the same order the procedure of 
how it will resolve all outstanding discovery disputes by 
appointment of a special master, when the trial court suddenly 
abandons its established procedure and instead entertains a 
separate motion for sanctions and dismisses Aurora's claims 
without even considering Aurora's objections to the discovery or 
the defendants' own discovery abuses, reasonable minds can only 
conclude that the court has abused its discretion. The trial 
court's dismissal of Aurora's claims must be reversed to prevent 
a complete miscarriage of justice and to prevent Utah's courts 
from becoming a party to defendant Gay's fraud. 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments above clearly demonstrate that the Court of 
Appeals must reverse the trial court's decision to dismiss 
Aurora's claims herein with prejudice. Aurora has established two 
legal errors, either of which require the reversal of the trial 
court's decision: (1) the trial court was without any authority 
to grant defendants' compel motion because the attempted service 
of defendants' discovery was fatally defective; and (2) the trial 
court erred in its legal conclusion that Aurora violated the 
April 8, 2 003 Order. Aurora has also established that, even 
assuming for argument's sake that the legal errors not made, the 
trial court abused its discretion in dismissing Aurora's claims 
under the circumstances of this case, e.g., never having ruled on 
the objections of Aurora to the discovery, not making any factual 
findings to support its legal conclusions, and considering 
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defendants' sanctions motion in violation of the trial courts 
own order, without complying with its own order's promise to 
appoint a special master to resolve these very kinds of issues, 
and without even considering Aurora's substantial objections to 
defendats' discovery responses. 
Therefor, Aurora requests the Appeals Court correct this 
miscarriage of justice and reverse the trial court's decision and 
remand the matter for a decision on Aurora's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, and the appointment of a special master to 
resolve the discovery disputes. With all due respect, Aurora also 
requests the Appeals Court order the current trial judge be 
replaced, as proceedings below have left Aurora with questions as 
to his impartiality or willingness to do the job necessary to 
resolve the issues in this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of May, 2 005. 
Eric P. Hartman 
Attorney for Aurora 
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PERTINENT PORTIONS OF IMPORTANT RULES 
Rule 5(b)(1): 
(b) Service: How made and by whom. 
(b)(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or 
permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney the 
service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the 
party is ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or upon 
the party shall be made by delivering a copy or by mailing a copy 
to the last known address or, if no address is known, by leaving 
it with the clerk of the court. 
Rule 37: 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon 
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected 
thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as follows: 
. . . 
(a)(2)(B) If a deponent fails to answer a question 
propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or 
other entity fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 
31(a), or a party fails to answer an interrogatorysubmitted under 
Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a request for inspection 
submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection will be 
permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as 
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling 
an answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in 
accordance with the request. The motion must include a 
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or 
attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make the 
discovery in an effort to secure the information or material 
without court action. When taking a depositionon oral 
examination, the proponent of the question may complete or 
adjourn the examination before applying for an order. 
(a)(3) Evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or 
response. For purposes of this subdivision an evasive or 
incomplete disclosure, answer, or response is to be treated as a 
failure to disclose, answer, or respond. 
. . . 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
. . . 
(b)(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a 
party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a 
person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on 
behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit 
discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this 
rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order entered 
under Rule 16(b), the court in which the action is pending may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among 
others the following: 
(b)(2)(A) an order that the matters regarding which the 
order was made or any other designated factsshall be taken to be 
established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the 
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claim of the party obtaining the order; 
(b)(2)(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party 
to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or 
prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence; 
(b)(2)(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, 
staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing 
the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a 
judgment by default against the disobedient party; ..• . 
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Ruling Portion of Transcript of March 26, 2003 Hearing 
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MR. HARTMAN: I—does the Court—I mean, there's a 
lot to be said about the—the adequacy of their discovery and 
I will—should I assume that the Court wants to— 
THE COURT: I'm going to address that right now. 
Okay? 
Here's what I'm going to do in this matter. I am 
going to allow additional discovery that has been propounded 
by the defendants in this matter to the plaintiffs. I'm also 
going to allow plaintiffs additional time in this matter. All 
discovery in this case will be completed sixty days from 
today's date. Operative word is completed, gentlemen. This 
case is almost as old as my children. I'm not going to have 
it sitting around here another five or ten years; of course, 
if you want to, I guess we can. I'll be retired maybe by the 
time it comes to trial and I won't have to worry about it. 
Sixty days you're going to finish your discovery. 
If 35 days from today, I hear from either side that 
there is a issue concerning dispute about discovery, we will 
appear here, I will appoint a special master, which will 
settle all discovery issues, rule on objections to claims of 
privileged documents. 
I find it hard to understand, Mr. Magleby, how any 
documents could possibly be privileged in this case, other 
than communications to one's attorney. Certainly that's not 
what we have in all these boxes, I wouldn't think. 
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And he will rule, or she will rule on those issues. 
The cost of that special master will be borne equally by the 
parties. 
There will be no attorney's fees awarded for this 
hearing today to either side. 
Are there any questions? 
MR. HARTMAN: I have one question, your Honor. 
Regarding this 35 days, I think the Court can see from—from 
our original objection and from our addendum that we obviously 
have significant issues with respect to defendants' discovery 
response. 
Would the Court like a—a new motion for sanctions 
to be filed within 35 days? I—I'm not entirely clear on how 
the Court wants to— 
THE COURT: Well, I'm assuming that within 3 5 days, 
you will have the answers to the interrogatories and the 
discovery that you've propounded to them. That's why I used 
35 days. 
MR. MAGLEBY: They have our answers, yes, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Well— 
MR. MAGLEBY: And within 3 5 days, we will have the— 
MR. HARTMAN: He's apparently—the defendants' 
position is apparently that they have produced things. And— 
THE COURT: Well, then I guess—I guess if you want 
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to file something that says that they have said that they've 
produced everything and they haven't, why then, you can file 
it, certainly can file it whenever you get it ready. You 
don't have to wait for 35 days to do that. 
If they—if—if what their representation that Mr. 
Magleby's telling me today is they—they have responded to 
everything they intend to respond to, then I guess it's up to 
you to file the request to have a special master meet with you 
and resolve these issues. Okay? 
MR. HARTMAN: One other—other question, your Honor. 
Did you—I didn't catch whether you ruled on the issue of 
withdrawal of counsel? 
THE COURT: I'm not going to allow the withdrawal at 
this time. They can raise it—renew that issue at a later 
date. 
MR. HARTMAN: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: We'll be in recess. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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